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Preface
In 2004 Vietnam opened negotiations with China about an ambitious joint project
that would make the Gulf of Tongking an important economic motor of develop-
ment for both countries. The approach resulted in a joint agreement called "Two
Corridors and One Rim" that was signed in October 2004. This grand project pro-
posed to link the two land corridors of Yunnan and Guangxi with Hanoi and Hiti
Phimg, while a maritime rim would connect Guangxi, Guangdong, Hainan Island,
northern and central Vietnam, and Laos. Work began soon after. At the moment,
both countries are constructing twelve major highways plus two high-speed rail
lines linking Hanoi with Yunnan and with Guangxi. From being seen as an eco-
nomic backwater for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Gulf of
Tongking bas now suddenly emerged as a major engine of growth for both China
and Vietnam.
While such intensive economic activity in the gulf region might seem new to
contemporary eyes, from a historical perspective its antecedents go back well
over two millennia. This emerging form of twenty-first-century regional integra-
tion, which refocused interest on the gulf and its surrounding hinterlands, has also
stimulated the desire to rethink the forces that linked or separated the many
peoples who have inhabited this area over the millennia. With this in mind, Li
Tana approached the Australian National University and the Guangxi Academy of
Social Sciences with a proposal to gather specialists in different disciplines and
eras to confer about the wider Tongking Gulf region throughout history or, in the
fonnulation of the eminent French historian Fernand Braudel, over the longue
duree. Thanks to the support of these institutions, a number of scholars were able
to gather in Nanning in 2008 to explore the interconnected economic and social
history of this ancient area. To help stimulate thougbt and discussion, the confer-
ence organizers proposed as a starting hypothesis that the Gulf of Tongking might
be considered as a mini-Mediterranean, as a place in which, as in Braudel's
Mediterranean, the age-old interactions and interconnections between its various
peoples shaped a region that was united less by geography tban by the movements
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their social and economic power. This reading of the archaeological evidence also
suggests that metallurgy and textile technology were catalysts that combined to
propel these societies ooto the trajectories that concern historians and laid down
the basic economic foundations of the societies that would later flourish in the
Tongking Gulf region.
Chapter 2
Jiaozhi (Giao Chi) in the
Han Period Tongking Gulf
LiTana
This chapter introduces early Jiaozhi, a territorial unit covering the present-day
Red River plains, coastal Guangxi, and western Guangdong, and discusses its im-
portance in the exchange system of the Gulf of Tongking and South China Sea
nearly two millennia ago. Contrary to conventional scholarship, which has stressed
political forces pushing from north to south that resulted in Chinese colonization
of the Red River plain, this chapter examines early Jiaozhi in its own context, as
a territorial expanse occupying the same horizontal line. It argues that, by elimi-
nating the once powerful Nanyue (southern Yue) kingdom in III B.C.B., the Han
dynasty established Jiaozhi's dominant trading position as both market and
entrepot for goods brought by land and sea. Jiaozhi's emergence as the jewel of
the Han south highlights the importance of the Gulf of Tongking for the early
maritime silk road, as well as revealing the mutual interdependence of the region
of modem Guangxi and the Red River plain so long ago.
Guangzhou (Canton) andJiaozhi
The Nanyue kingdom, based in present-day Guangzhou (Canton), had enjoyed a
commanding position on the Tongking Gulf coast until the Han conquest in III
B.C.E., after which the southern political and economic center of gravity moved to
Jiaozhi. This change seemed to have resulted from a deliberate Han policy; but
why would the dynasty want to favor Jiaozhi and suppress Guangzhou? The most
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Figure 2.1. Households in Guangdong, Guangxi, and northern and central Vietnam, 2 C.E.
Table 2.1. Households in the Han Empire's
Coastal South, 2 C.E.
(85,323 households), 58 percent in current northern and north-central Vietnam
(143,643 households), but only 8 percent in the Guangdong area (see Figure 2.1).
Jiaozhi's population density was also remarkably higher than that of Guang-
dong. According to one Chinese authority on population history, the density ratio
of Guangdong to Jiaozhi was 1:9.6, while coastal Guangxi and today's Thanh
H6a Province (in central Vietnam) were about two to three times more populous
than Guangdong. In fact, Jiaozhi was even more densely populated than the
Chengdu area in Sichuan.' As Table 2.2 shows, the average size of the households
in Jiaozhi was also fairly large and, interestingly, larger than in some parts of
northern China at the same time.
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Two millennia ago, then, the bulk of the population of southern and more es-
tablished areas was in Jiaozhi, that is, present-day Guangxi, western Guangdong,
and the Vietnamese gulf shore. Jiaozhi was the cosmopolittm center of this part of
Asia, flanked by Hepu and Xuwen to the north and Ciru Chiln and Nhilt Nam
(Quang Trj to Qming Nam) to the south."
A second sigoificant point should be made about this populous coastalbel!.
All its important and documented ports-Hepu, Xuwen, and Nhilt Nam-thrived
by trade and trade alone. Hepu's fortune started with locally produced pearls,
which were traded both north and south, while Nhilt Nam's fortune rested on its
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Thanks in part to the factors discussed above, from the first to the tenth century,
when Guangzhou and the lands to its east became the most populous in the far
south of the Han Empire, the lands along the littoral rim of the extended Gulf of
Tongking ruled over the South China Sea economy. In 2 C.E. Jiaozhi reported four
times as many households as Guangzhou, and even the population of what is now
Thanh H6a Province (Jiuzhen, or Ciru Chan in Vietoamese) was roughly double
that of Guangzhou (see Table 2.1).'
The disparity is equally striking in terms of household distribution along the
extended Gulf of Tongking littoral rim: 34 percent in modem eastern Guangxi
The Gulf ofTongl<ing-Economic Center
of the Early South China Sea Trade
obvious answer, from a central government viewpoint, is that Jiaozhi was easier
to access and control. Until the eighth century, when the Five Passes land route
was opened to Guangdong, the gulf region was always better connected to central
China, thanks to the Ling canal ("Smart Trench"), which had been dug between
223 and 214 B.C.E to transport Qin troops south. It linked the Yangzi with the
Xiang River in Hunan, from where traffic accessed the Li River in Guangxi and
the North and South Liu Rivers leading to the Hepu maritime port. This important
economic corridor also formed the confluence of the two major cultures of
southern China-the Chu and Yue--as is shown by the large number of Han
tombs uncovered along it. I It was also a strategically significant route. In 40 C.E.,
after the Trung sisters rebelled in Jiaozhi, the forces of the "Wave-Cahning Gen-
eral" Ma Yuan, who was ordered to put down the rebellion, took this very route to
JiaozhLl A land route also existed, running from today's Liuzholl via the Yu River
to the Southern Pass. By both land and water, Guangxi thus held a crucial position.
Jiaozhi also provided the court with easier access to Yunnan and beyond,3 by a
route that went up the Red River to Yunnan before pushing on to the overland
"yak road" (maoniu dao) in modem Sichuan.'
Most important, Jiaozhi was the nearest point between the Han court and the
maritime silk road before it became possible to travel across the open sea in the
eighth century. Sea travel favored Canton. Until then, Canton's earlier access to
Southeast Asia had necessarily passed via its contacts with Jiaozhi. All these
factors worked in favor of Jiaozhi, whose prosperity it helped to sustain until the
eighth century.
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Table 2.2. Estimated Average Size of Households in Population Centers, 2 C.E.
location between the Mekong Delta civilization of Oc Eo and China. None of
these ports had a large population base when compared to Jiaozhi. But what was
the source of the wealth and population density here in the first century C.E.? To
answer this question we need to begin by considering Jiaozhi's economic relations
with its neighbors.
First and most fundamental, piecing together contemporaneous sources reveals
that Jiaozhi was the regional granary whose rice supplied its nearest neighbors.
Of Hepu to its north it was reported that "Hepu does not produce rice but only
pearls. It is next to Jiaozhi and often trades [pearls] for rice." The interdependence
of the two economies helps explain why pearls had been recorded as a Jiaozhi
local product since the first century C.E., although they actually originated in
Hepu.9 Their economic symbiosis became clear when local officials in Hepu be-
came too greedy in the mid-second century: "Traders stopped coming [to the
Hepu area], and people lost their livelihood. The poor starved on the roads."10
While Hepu people went pearling, Jiaozhi's southern neighbors in Ciru Chiln
mainly made their living by hunting and gathering: "Customarily Ciru Chan lived
on hunting and did not know about plowing with draft oxen. People often had to
buy rice from Jiaozhi, and sometimes went short of it."ll
While the above information suggests how mutually beneficial exchanges
knitted the Gulf of Tongking region together, another Jiaozhi product linked it to
the more distant hinterland. A second source of early Jiaozhi's wealth apparently
came from trading cowries, for which Jiaozhi was renowned long after shells
were abandoned as currency in China. The Guangzhouji (Records on Guangzhou)
says that the most precious seashells-purple shells-eame from Jiaozhou, which
perhaps indicated the Gulf of Tongking but also possibly somewhere farther
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south,!' while large shells originated from today's central Vietnam. Both were
"traded with traveling merchants.,,13 Hainan, on the eastern shore of the Gulf of.
Tongking, also produced valuable purple shells. One very early Chinese source,
the Shangshu dazhuan (Major Tradition of Venerated Documents, 100-200 B.C.E.),
mentioned that big shells came from the "South Sea," which suggests this well-
known tenn, in one of its earliest recorded usages, originally referred to the Gulf
of Tongking. 14
This put the gulf region in a favorable position in exchanges with central
China. As late as the Han dynasty, seashells were precious items. Under the rule
of Wang Mang (9-23 C.E.), cowries were exchanged directly for copper coins.
The Hanshu gave the exchange ratios of different sizes of shells: large shells, like
those from central Vietnam, equaled 216 cash of coins, and were four times more
expensive than medium-sized shells and twenty-one times more expensive than
small ones. 15 If, as this suggests, shells could be a fonn of currency, cowries must
have boosted Jiaozhi's wealth greatly. Yunnan's cowry currency also possibly
came through Jiaozhi, if not from Jiaozhi itself. An important link between them
has just been established by a Chinese historian who argues that the Han period
"silk route of the southwest," long considered as running from Sichuan and
Yunnan to India, in fact went from Yunnan through Jiaozhi to the sea. 16 All this ex-
plains why Zhao Tuo (Tri~u Da), the king of Nanyue (Nam Vi~t), included 500
purple shells among prized gifts to the Han emperor. The rest of Zhao Tuo's list
of presents reveals what was considered exotic and precious from the second
century B.C.E. south: "one white colored jade, ten rhinoceros horns, one jar of cin-
namon bark, 1,000 kingfishers ... two peacocks, and forty lots of kingfisher
feathers."!7 Interestingly, typical exotics from South and Central Asia, such as
amber, crystal, and glass beads, were yet to appear, while, except for the jade, all the
other presents were listed in the first-century-c.E. book Jiaozhou yiwu zhi (Exotic
Things of Jiaozhou).
Not only were Jiaozhi and its neighbors crucial sources of natural wealth, its
people were also industrious producers of highly prized handicrafts. Advanced
agriculture with its stable supply of rice and foodstuffs provided the foundation
for local handicraft industries whose influence radiated out to Jiaozhi's north and
south. Swedish archaeologist Olov Janse, for instance, found locally produced
ceramic together with stone, copper, iron, ·gold, silver, and jade wares in Han-
style tombs that were spread widely in the old land of Jiaozhi from the coast to the
mountains. 18 Jiaozhi's large population and natural resources, with the comparative
advantage for specialist craft production that they imply, help us better understand
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the catalog of seemingly fantastical goods reportedly made here. One well-known
example is sugar candy, called in Jiaozhi "stone honey" (shimi).19 "Fragrant paper,"
made from the bark of an aromatic tree, was another: a delegation from Rome
brought 30,000 pages of such paper to Nanjing in 285," along with a fabulous
fabric that could only be washed by fire (asbestos cloth, huowan bU).21 Another
local paper, this one made from seaweed and called "twill paper" (celi zhz),
became well known in the third century.2 Numerous ceramic kilns existed in the
modem Thanh Hoa area, which supplied everyday wares to locals and bricks,
tiles, and slabs for house and tomb construction." Some 5,000 Han burials have
been found around Hepu (present-day Lianzhou), together with numerous ceramics
kilns from the Han period. Similar pieces to those produced here have been found
in Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Banten, suggesting Hepu developed its export hand-
icraft production during the boom years of the maritime silk road.24 Locally made
glassware and glass beads are also abundant in old Hepu tombs, as Brigitte
Borell's chapter discusses.25
Silk was also a prized commodity of the Jiaozhi region, whose relatively
dense population was able to provide the security of food supply essential to the
industry. Jiaozhi's government center, Luy Liu, derived its name from the Viet-
namese word for mulberry (ddu); it lay on the Dau River, where mulberry trees
were grown and silk produced; and it housed the most ancient Buddhist temple in
Vietnam, the Dau Temple, whose name also derived from ddu.26 Many important
communication routes and waterways crisscrossed the region, including the routes
to PM L~i, Bong Tri6u, and Quimg Ninh, going as far as the modem Sino-
Vietnamese frontier (presently route no. 18), and the route linking the Dau both to
the Bu6ng and Red Rivers and to the Lvc Bilu and Thai Binh Rivers and the sea.27
In the third century C.B, silk production was so well established in neighboring
Nh~t Nam that cocoons were produced eight times a year.28
All these products became kllown between the second and third centuries, a
time when modem archaeological excavations of contemporaneous tombs in
Hepu, Jiaozhi, and Ciru Chan have revealed the wealth of local society. Viet-
namese archaeologists have excavated enormous Han tombs in northern Vietnam
whose diameters were twenty to thirty times those of the Later Han period. The
no.I Han tomb in the Wangniuling site in Hepu, or modem Lianzhou,29 was of a
similar ~ize.
. Another important local handicraft product requires analysis here, but it was
not something likely to appear in ancient Chinese catalogs of southern exotica. I
refer to bronze drums, which are discussed in the next section.
Bronze Drums-Crossbred on the
Sino-Vietnamese Cultural Rim
The early history of Vietnam is conventionally divided into two parts: the ages of
bronze and iron. The Bronze Age was indigenous, symbolized by Bong Son
culture and especially by bronze drums. Then the Chinese invasion disrupted
local tradition by starting the Iron Age. But there is a puzzle in this: although Chi-
nese administrations were set up here in the second century B.C.E., a large number
of bronze drums-symbols of indigenous power and chiefly authority-were cast
after Chinese occupation. The NgQc Lfr bronze drum, the icon of traditional Viet-
namese culture, was, according to the French colonial scholarVictor Goloubew,
cast by local people in the Red River Delta during the first century C.B., that is, at
least one century after Chinese rule started.30 It might be argued that bronze drums
were still being made by Red River Delta people, irrespective of Chinese rule; or
that the drums had been cast by peoples in the surrounding hill country who were
remote from Chinese rule. But an intriguing third possibility exists: that the two
traditions ran parallel and intensively interacted. Archaeologists have ample evi-
dence to show that the bronze drums resulted from intensive interactions between
different peoples; but historians still tend to think that bronze drums were so
sacred to the local chiefdoms that they must have been cast secretly in some
mountains using some "traditional" techniques passed on unchanged for genera-
tions.J1 Archaeologists, on the other hand, believe bronze drum casting required
an open system to sustain it: because the task demanded "both artistic and technical
skill of a high order,"" artisans were shared throughout the region. Thus Magdalene
von Dewall has suggested the existence of local specialist workshops whose
craftsmen, although using similar techniques and common artifact forms, sought
to create their own decorative motifs and styles. This would require considerable
mobility of artisans and materials alike.
High levels of artistic and technical skills, let alone specialist workshops, are
also expensive t9 support, raising the question of how local society afforded this
luxury. Significantly, features of rice processing appear on two of the most famous
Vietnamese drums, the NgQc Lit and Hoang H~ drums." As early Chinese records
quoted above suggest, both Hepu and Ciru Chiln relied on Jiaozhi for rice, so
these depictions of rice processing suggest the existence of a nonsubsistence or
self-sustained economy, one based on exchanging rice for other commodities. In
this context, it is interesting that Wang Mang-era coins (8-25 C.B.) have been ex-
cavated alongside Bong Son bronzes. Given that Wang Mang coins from central
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Rather than being a symbol of independence, bronze drums at this time might
be better understood to signify adaptation by both the Chinese and the local elites.
The best governors were always either those who could work with local chiefs
and enjoy their support or those who were themselves "big men." The best-known
cases were Shi Xie (SI Nhi6p in Vietoamese) and his brothers, who ruled Nanbai,
Hepu, Jiaozhi, and Ciru Chan in the second century C.E., and the Du Huidu family
in the fifth century. Both families were local: the Shi rose from Cangwu in
Map 3. Bronze Age sites. From Charles Higham, The Bronze Age ofSoutheast Asia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),92.
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China were exchanged for valuable purple shells from Jiaozhi, it is not unreason-
able to hypothesize that wealth generated from economic exchanges facilitated
the continuation of the bronze drum tradition, and that it was these exchanges that
carried bronze drums and their casting technique from Jiaozhi to the coastal
Guangxi region, where Michael Churchman's chapter discusses their role and sig-
nificance. Recent Chinese studies on the alloys used in bronze drums indicate that
some Dong Son drums came from China, but that others found in Guangxi had
originated in the Bong San cultural zone and were brought to Guangxi later.34 The
authors of these studies further concluded that Guangxi's typical Lengshuichong-
type bronze drums developed under the influence of Dong Son drums and that the
golden era of bronze drum casting in Guangxi was under the Han, precisely when
intensive contacts between the Guangxi coast and Jiaozhi were most evident.
At this point we should stop and ponder the political context of this bronze
drum casting. There are two salient aspects to the story: if bronze drums were
symbols of local power, then the 600 plus new drums that were cast from the first
to the s:ixth centuries suggest increasing rather than decreasing numbers of local
power centers; and if drum casting was tied so intimately to production, exchange,
and wealth generation in the region, it is most likely to have occurred at or near
the main centers of action, effectively under the noses of Chinese administrators.
In fact, in 1999 a terra-cotta mold for a Dong Son drum was found by the
Japanese archaeologist Nishimura Masanari at Luy L§.u, the earliest Chinese ad-
ministrative site in Jiaozhi (from III B.C.E.)." He regarded the type of mold as
similar to others from Shang and Zhou sites in China. Nishimura actually suggested
the Dong Son phase belonged in the late metal age, and some other Japanese
scholars argued that, contrary to the conventional ~elief ,that the Han invasion
ended Dong Son culture, Dong Son artifacts, including drums, remained in use
and were adopted into Han-style surroundings."
There was no reason why Chinese governors would oppose such casting, and
no record suggests the casting of bronze drums was prohibited. After all, alien Han
rule had been imposed from outside and, as Keith Taylor noted, "the Chinese had
to adjust their habits to the local culture; they were in no position to force their way
of life on the local people."37 In Southeast Asia the key to a center's control over
manpower was its ability to fonn political alliances with the locally based elite-
the "big men."38 The Chinese government's support for and reliance on "big men"
was indicated clearly in a Tang record: "for those local chiefs who were more pow-
erful than others because of their wealth from slaves, pearls, and elephants, the
court often gave official positions in order to obtain profits from them. This practice
was carried out in all the dynasties of Song, Qi, Liang, and Chen."39
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Guangxi, and the Du from Chu Dien in Jiaozhi. Their wealth and local influence
surely played a key role in their appointments.
Examining these factors-population, rice production, and important local
sources of wealth-strongly indicates that it was early Jiaozhi, rather than
Guangzhou, that was the regional integrating force, linking both central China to
the Gulf of Tongking and Yunnan to the sea. Modem northern and north-central
Vietnam thus formed the most important ancient trading partner of central China
before the maritime silk road came into being. As Wang Gungwu pointed out,
Jiaozhi's "very value to China lay in its overseas trade."40 This trade became
crocial to China with the decline of the Later Han and its consequent loss of
control of the northwestern overland routes. The Han formally abandoned the
overland silk road in 107 C.E., and thereafter connections between China and the
West became concentrated on the southern coast. Indian merchants were recorded
as beginning to "pay tribute" in 159 and 161, arriving via Jiaozhi, and as their
trade to island Southeast Asia became more frequent it must have injected new vi-
tality into the Nanhai trade, for which Jiaozhi was the terminus.
Jiaozhi from a Horizontal View
In previous sections I have used the term "Jiaozhi" as if it were not problematic, for
convenience, as if it denoted a specific place, when in fact precisely defining
"Jiaozhi" is ahistorical headache. When a source says "Jiaozhi" it could be referring
to a district, a prefecture, or aprovince, depending On who said it and when.41 In the
first century B.C.E. "Jiaozhi" included coastal Guangdong and Guangxi, and its ad-
ministrative capital moved between Luy L~u in the Red River Delta and Hepu
(Lianzhou) and Guangxin (Wuzhou) in modem Guangxi, and Guangzhou. We are
not even sure of the location of its main port. Similarly, "Rinan," or "Nh~t Nam" in
Vietnamese, is equally confusing. "Rinan" referred to the pivotal center that linked
early imperial China with the outside world, but the location to which the name was
applied moved from today's Hu~-QuimgNam area (up to the second century) north
to modemNgh~.Anand Thanh Hoa by the fifth century." Like Jiaozhi, there was no
single port called Rinan, but several ports with the same name and status. The same
is true of Hepu. Rather than there being a fixed port, one Chinese scholar has argued
that when coastal peoples spontaneously organized maritime activities, any suitable
location would become a port, and the ports used by official ships might only be
those used relatively more often by ordinary people. "Hepu port" therefore might be
a collective name designating several ports on today's Guangxi coast.43
What we see here is the sharing ofnames of ports and overlapping territories:
until the third century "Jiaozhi" might have been either modem northern Vietnam
or Guangxi and the western Guangdong coast; while "Rinan" was shared between
central Vietnam and Champa for a few hundred years. What this suggests to me is
that such names indicated circles or clusters of trading centers rather than
specific ports with a defined area and fixed territory. This reminds us of the
Southeast Asian mandala pattern with local power, radiating from often com-
paratively short-term centers, acting to hold together systems ,that were increas-
ingly unstable toward the margins. As Oliver Wolters noted, such a network of
small settlements "reveals itself in historical records as a patchwork of often
I
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over appmg mandalas."
Talking about a "mandala pattern," or a "mini-Mediterranean," sounds strange
in a context where the whole gulf region was supposedly darkened by the huge
shadow of China. At first glance, the Tongking Gulf political landscape could not
be farther from either pattern, both of which imply numbers of principalities op-
erating on more or less equal terms. The overwhelming political and economic
center, China, should theoretically always have prevented a situation ofcompeting
centers from emerging here. But one countervailing historical characteristic of
China mitigated this effect: political and economic power in China tended to be
far more concentrated in its own center than ever happened in Europe, where a
post-Roman center as such was hard to identify." This situation is profoundly im-
portant for our understanding of the Gulf of Tongking and, when coupled with a
maritime outlook, it illuminates the gulf region at the time. Looking down from
central China only reveals an annex in the Jiaozhi region; but to look northward
from the southern edge of the Gulf of Tongking (from modem central Vietnam),
and beyond the administrative units called provinces, prefectures, and districts,
reveals a chain of principalities scattered from the coast to the hinterland, from
modern Guangxi down to central Vietnam and Laos.
Casting off a China-centered view allows us to see these principalities in
more equal terms rather than as a hierarchical set of provinces and prefectures.
The perspective elucidates many stories of this region like, for instance, why pre-
eighth-century sources are so vague about the main port of Jiaozhi. There was no
main port, like we see in Guangzhou from the eighth century, but a group of ports
competing against each other, stretching from central Vietnam to the Guangxi
coast. Even Guangzhou was in competition with Jiaozhi as late as 774.46 This new
perspective also helps us better understand relations between the Red River Delta
and the modem central Vietnam area. In written sources, Ciru Chan and Nh~t
Nam appear as subordinate units within the, province of Jiaozhi. Chinese rule was
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supposed to penetrate them through Jiaozhi's governance of the Red River Delta.
However, if we peruse the sources carefully, CUll Chan and Nh~t Nam were more
often mentioned as equals of Jiaozhi, not as its subordinates. Numerous records
indicate eCru Chao even attacked Jiaozhi from time to time.47 Cfru Chan's relative
autonomy shows clearly when the area of modem Hanoi was repeatedly attacked
by the.Nanzhao kingdom in 860 and 862, culminating in its occupation from 862
to 866. The Tang dynasty recrnited armies from as far as modern Hunan and
Sichuan to rescue it, but, curiously, nothing came from its "subordinate" neighbor
Ciru CMn. Central Vietnam had long developed in parallel with the Red River
Delta and, after Vietnamese independence in the tenth century, apparently tended
to drift away from the political power of the Delta. The Former U; dynasty fought
with CMu Ai (later Ngh~ An) in 989, 1006, and 1009, as did the Ly dynasty in
lOll, 1012, 1029, 1031, 1035, and 1043. It required a major defeat of Champa in
1044 to end tensions between the Delta and Chau Ai, which had been rather pre-
maturely renamed Ngh~An ("righteously pacified") in 1036.48
Applying a mandala pattern helps to unpack the rich burden of historical
records with which we are simultaneously blessed and cursed. Unlike the rest of
Southeast Asia, for which limited textual evidence exists, Vietnam has a clear and
often detailed chronology. While we are forhmate in this respect, our view has
often been framed by that chronology, with its endless administrative details and
military actions. It inevitably guides our historical understanding of the region by
imposing both a top-down and a China-centered perception of events. The mandala
pattern, however, helps shift the vertical view to a horizontal one, in the process
revealing a more complex and nuanced early historical situation in the gulf
region, one characterized by competing political and economic principalities.
Thus it seems to me that all the factors discussed above-trade and local man-
ufacture, loose Chinese rule over a mandala-patterned region, and bronze drum
casting-are most fruitfully understood as elements of the same context rather
than as. belonging to quite different times and places. Certainly, this period needs
more careful research; but in my view recent studies now provide a workable
basis from which to challenge these two essentialized traditions that exclude and
oppose each other. Such narrow views "tended to detach local society and indige-
nous populations from the state-making process, and permitted the history of mil-
itary conquest" to dominate, as Pamela Grossley and her colleagues have nicely
put it,49 Yet, as their studies on Qing China show, even when the bureaucratic ma-
chine was at its most sophisticated, Chinese rule at the imperial margins was
hardly a simple process of Sinicization, if by this we mean an irrevocable -assim-
ilation in a single direction.
The Slow Demise ofJiaozhi's Trading Preeminence
The new maritime silk road stimulated the emergence of a system of minor ports.
From Hepu southward there were Jiaozhi, Ciru Chan, Nh~t Nam, and Linyi, and
between Linyi and Oc Eo there were more than ten principalities subordinated to
a larger entity called Xitu.5o China's loss of control of the overland silk road and
shift to the maritime alternative thus played a direct role in fonning new princi-
palities along the Tongking Gulf. Linyi (the northern part of what would become
Champa) would benefit most from this new development, with archaeological
findings over the last two decades indicating that, until the fourth century, Chinese
influence predominated in the area that would later become "Hinduized" Champa.51
These significant findings tum our eyes northward and provide a more solid basis
for our understanding of interactions in the Gulf of Tongking. In this new and
perhaps most important round of first-millennium reorganization in the gulf
region, a new competitor, known in the texts as Linyi, emerged from the fonner
territory of Nh~t Nam to challenge Jiaozhi's economic position. Its second-
century rise was not accidental: Linyi was ideally located between Jiaozhi, the
main port of south China, and Oc Eo, the major commercial center of the Nanhai
trade through which passed most of the trade of the Nanhai and Roman Orient."
Many exotic items that Cham traders offered as "tribute" in China might have
come from Oc Eo. To Linyi's west was the then mighty kingdom of Ailao, from
which Cham traders could access copper, iron, tin, gold, silver, and rhinoceros
horn.53 Linyi thus became the middleman between China and Oc Eo through
which China was linked to India and the Roman Orient.
IfLinyi challenged Jiaozhi's former dominance, it continued to play an important
role in the Tongking Gulfuntil a combination of factors brought about its demise as
a commercial powerhouse from the eighth century onward. The crisis that precipi-
tated Jiaozhi's decline arose largely from external factors beyond its control, begin-
ning in 728 when the Dayu Mountain road opened and made Guangzhou much
more conveniently connected to the hinterland than Jiaozhi, meaning that goods
from southern China reached Guangdong in greater abundance. 54 Another change,
this time from the south, also badly affected Jiaozhi's trade. Throughout the eighth
century the vast kingdom of Zhenla (or Chan L~p in Vietnamese) was disintegrating
into two states. Land Zhenla (modern northern Cambodia, southern Laos, and
eastern Siam) had been one of Jiaozhi's most important trading partners; one of
the key routes recorded in the Tang dynasty was from Jiaozhi to Land Zhenla,
since many luxury items in demand in China, like ivory, rhinoceros horns, aromatic
woods, and kingfisher feathers, had originated in the Indochinese hinterland.55
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The Zhenla civil war must have impacted badly on Jiaozhi's trade to the sonthwest
at the same time that it benefited Champa, whose commercially oriented string of
mandala-patterned polities had taken over Oc Eo's role in a Nanhai trade that would
increasingly come to depend on ports in modem central Vietnam.
But by this time, even Champa was no longer the prince of the Nanhai trade. As
Wang Gungwo points out, in the ninth century the main routes taken by Persian and
Arab middlemen in the Nanhai trade completely bypassed Zhenla. Disorder in
Zhenla had helped wreck its sea trade, while the rise of these middlemen further
eclipsed it as a commercial power." The Persians preferred to sail directly to
Guangzhou on the open sea, with catastrophic consequences for a series of small
port kingdoms such as Panpan, Langyaxiu, Dandan, and Chitu. It seems very likely
that Jiaozhi had commercial contacts with many or all ofthese small port kingdoms:
Panpao, for example, was recorded in one Chinese history as forty days' sail from
Jiaozhi.57 Their disappearance would have further undermined Jiaozhi's trading po-
sition at the same time that powerful rivals were arising farther east, not only
Guangzhou but also the independent kingdom of Fujian (Min), which began to
attract foreign traders at this time. So keen was Min's founder to foster commerce
that he had rocks obstructing the harbor removed.58
This was the start of a major reorganization in the South China Sea trade that
saw Fujian's ports become predominant right after Vietnam became independent
in the tenth century. Archaeological findings eloquently chart the slow demise of
Jiaozhi from first-century queen of the Tongking Gulf to tenth-century nonentity.
Appropriately, the evidence derives from the construction of local tombs: from the
first to roughly the sixth centuries, tombs excavated in northern Vietnam were huge
and skillfully decorated with ornate bricks; but from the Sui and Tang dynasties
(seventh to tenth centuries) their ,size and decoration increasingly diminished until,
during the Tang, they ended up as little more than cramped, plain spaces, a fraction
of their fonner imposing size and beauty.59
Chapter 3
Han Period Glass Vessels
in the Early Tongking Gulf Region
Brigitte Borell
Archaeological investigations in Han dynasty tombs in Guangxi, China, have un-
covered a small number of unusual glass vessels. The chronology of the tombs
suggests that their initial production started around the middle or late Western
Han period (206 B.C.E.-8 C.E.) and continued well into the Eastern Han period
(25-220 C.E.). Although first thought to be imports, later chemical analyses of
some of this glassware have disproved a Mediterranean or Western Asiatic origin.
This chapter argues that these Han period glass vessels were in fact a local
product, manufactured in the Tongking Gulf region of modem northern Vietnam
and southern China.
The chapter begins by outlining the story of these glass vessels and analyzing
the evidence for their local origin. It then goes on to consider how recent archae-
ological excavations are providing material evidence of the extensive trade rela-
tions, described so long ago in the Hanshu, that existed between Tongking Gulf
ports and Southeast Asia and India.
Glass Vessels in Ancient Guangxi
During the last fifty years many glass artifacts have been excavated from Western
and Eastern Han period tombs in Guangxi Province, southern China. Most are
beads-in their thousands-and other personal ornaments that are also common
elsewhere in China from contexts dating to the Han; but some artifacts are glass
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